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ABSTRACT 
Projections of expenditures for old age pensions, survivor pensions, and disability 
pensions were made for the period 1985-2050 on the basis of future developments in the 
population structure by age, sex, and marital status. Six demographic scenarios were 
formulated: (i) a Benchmark scenario, with demographic rates kept constant at their 
1980-84 level; (ii) a Fertility scenario, with a rise of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
towards replacement level; (iii) a Mortality scenario, with reductions in mortality rates 
of 30 percent for females, and 45 percent for males; (iv) a Western scenario, which 
combines extreme demographic conditions of several West European countries: a TFR 
of 1.28, proportions never-marrying of one-third, one-third of marriages ending in divorce, 
and male and female life expectancies of 74 and 81 years, respectively; (v) a National 
scenario, with a TFR of 1.80 and male and female life expectancies increasing until 2050 
up to 88.6 years for females and 80.6 years for males; and (vi) a National Migration 
scenario, differing from the National scenario only by assuming an immigration of 100,000 
persons annually. 
The current pension system was combined with all six scenarios. Also, the impact of high 
female labor force participation, and a rise in the average age at retirement were 
investigated. 
The results indicate that changes in demographic conditions cannot prevent increases in 
and funding problems for pension expenditures in France. An increase in fertility has no 
effect on the pension system until 2030, when a larger generation will enter the labor 
force. Immigration reduces the deficit of the pension system only until 2015. Both 
immigration and longer active periods for males and females will cause enormous 
increases in pension expenditures in the future and are not long term solutions of the 
pension problem. Postponement of retirement age would help to balance the pension 
funds, but depends on the economic situation and on the labor market. Economic 
solutions such as indexing pensions on net instead of gross income should be considered. 
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1. POPULATION TRENDS 
1.1. Basic demographic trends 
In comparison with other European counmes, France has a particularly low fertility level at 
the beginning of the century. After World War 11, the baby boom occurred in France as in 
other European counmes (fig. 1). After the second maximum in 1964 (2.90 births per 
woman), the total fertility rate decreased slowly until 1971 (2.49). The 1971-1975 fall of 
fertility was moderate in France, the lowest point being 1.82 in 1978. After a slight recovery 
in 1980-1982 (1.94), fertility has stabilized a little above 1.80 birth. After the disappearence 
of large families in the 19501s, the low level of fertility is now due to the low level of fust- 
order-births (for the woman) under 0.80 1st birth per woman in 1979; it regularly decreased 
afterwards to less than 0.75 in 1986. As long as a substantial increase in 1st-birth-order 
fertility does not occur, overall fertility will remain well under the replacement level. The 
1986 family policy aimed at increasing the number of families with three children but has not 
been able to increase shwply total fertility rate. Birlh 
O/O per woman 
30 3.0 
0 1.6 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Figure 1. Total fertility rate and proportion of births out of wedlock 
Illegitimate fertility which was around 6 % in the 1950's and 1960's has increased after 1968. 
Over 25 % of births are illegitimate in 1988. 
After an increase until 1971 mainly due to earlier mean age at first marriage (from 23.3 years 
in 1950 to 22.4 years in 1974 for females and from 26.2 years to 24.5 years for males), primo 
nuptiality decreased (table 1). The proportion ever-married would reach 52.5 % for females 
(51.3 % for males) in the conditions of the year 1987. This evolution is partly due to 
consensual unions taking place before marriage or replacing legal marriage. Mean age at 1st 
marriage increased to 24.9 years for females and 27.0 for males in 1987. The present situation 
is closer to the European standard than for fertility. In 1988 1st marriages stopped decreasing 
and they will be higher in 1989 than in 1988. 
Table 1. Nuptiality 
Years 1950 1960 1970 1980 1085 1987 
Crude Marriage rate 
7.9 7.0 7.8 6.2 4.9 4.8 
Mean age at first marriage 
Females 23.5 22.4 23.0 24.3 24.9 
Males 26.1 24.4 25.2 26.4 27.0 
Number of divorces p. 1Om married women 
2.8 3.4 6.4 8.4 8.4 
Divorce was not very frequent before 1970: about 10 % marriages ended in divorce. Divorces 
increased after 1970 and 31 % of marriages end in divorce since 1986 
After a rapid increase in the 1950's, life expectancy at birth showed a slower progress in the 
1960's. Since 1975 a rapid progress reappeared and has accelerated since 1985. Life 
expectancy at birth was 72.0 years for males and 80.3 years for females in 1987. 
Consequently projections with low mortality are now preferred to projections with tendencial 
mortality made in 1985. Recent projections of mortality rates extend the decrease over 2020. 
The gap between male and female mortality in France is one of the most important in Europe, 
being over 8 years. It would not have changed by 2050 according to recent projections. Life 
expectancy at age 65 is 19.4 years for females and 15.0 years for males (table Ibis). 
Table 1 bis. Mortality - Life expectancy -1950-1987 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 
Females Males 
Llfe expectancy (years) 
at birth 69.2 73.8 76.1 78.4 79.4 80.3 63.4 67.2 68.6 70.2 71.3 72.0 
at age 60 18.4 19.5 20.8 22.4 23.0 23.7 15.4 15.6 16.2 17.3 17.9 18.4 
at age 80 6.1 6.3 7.2 7.7 8.0 8.4 5.0 5.1 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.6 
Survtvors (per 1OOO born) 
at age 60 795 860 882 903 913 918 697 754 774 790 803 814 
at age 80 354 4-36 498 576 611 636 214 243 271 315 345 370 
Natural increase is 0.4 % per annum since 1985 (crude birth rate (CBR) :13.9 per 1000 and 
crude death rate (CDR) :9.8 per 1000). It would not be negative before 2015 if fertility 
remains at 1.8. 
Immigration of workers was high in the 1970's. It was followed by "family regroupment" 
migration. The 0 migration rate inferred in the INSEE projections since the 1982 census was 
not reached and some officials estimate the net migration to be around 55,000 persons per 
year since 1982. 
The proportion of persons aged 60 years and over was high already in 1950, due to ancient 
low fertility. The low fertility of the 1930's should slow the pace of ageing in the near future. 
Moderate fertility (1.8) should prevent extremely high proportions of the elderly, but an 
important increase will occur anyway. 
1.2. Changes in the age structure of the population 
1.2.1. Common scenarios 
From 18.2 % in 1985, the proportion of the elderly population will slightly increase in the 
Bench Mark scenario (BM)(l) (table 2), reaching 19.5 % in 2000, and more rapidly 
afterwards: 22.6 % in 2015 and 26.0 % in 2030; little change will occur after 2030 - under the 
conditions included in this scenario. Higher fertility would reduce ageing after 2015, and 
more significantly after 2030, with 24.7 % of the population aged 60 and over (23.6 in 2050). 
Note that the increase in the proportion of the elderly is below the increase in the number 
until 2030. Therefore, the population of the elderly will increase by 24 % (from 18.2 % in 
1985 to 22.6 % in 2015 in the BM) when the numbers increase by 32 % (from 10.049.000 to 
13.219.000). 
The mortality scenario is quite plausible for women but is too optimistic for men. It leads to 
high proportions of the elderly: 25.4 % is reached as early as 2015 and 30.0 % in 2030. This 
is around 3 percentage points over the B M in 2015 and 4 and 5 percentage points 
respectively in 2030 and 2050. This quasi stabilisation of ageing after 2030 is only due to 
stabilisation of mortality; a further decrease of mortality rates would cause the prolongation 
of ageing (see below the national 1 scenario). Increase in the numbers of elderly is twice that 
of the BM in 2030 and after. 
The different parameters of the Western scenario are not very realistic for France. The 
proportion of the population aged 60 and over is similar to the mortality scenario until 2015, 
then the proportion is much higher, reaching 38.4 % in 2050, 7 percentage points over the 
mortality scenario, and 12 over the BM; this is mainly due to the very low fertility of this 
scenario. 
1BM : Rates of the 1980-1985 period constant until 2050. 
Western : extreme rates observed in Europe in 1980-1985. 
Fertility : fertility increases to replacement level in 2000. 
Mortality : mortality decreases until 2025. 
Table 2. Population by broad agegroups and sex ratio of the elderly, 195B2050 
Absolute (1000s) Relative (%) Sex ratio 
0- 14 1559 60+ Total B14 15-59 60 + Total 60 + 
1950 8 8 M  25775 6941 41 M 7  21.3 62.0 16.7 100.0 67.9 
1960 11848 26057 7560 45465 26.1 57.3 16.6 100.0 64.1 
1970 12553 28875 9100 50528 24.8 57.1 18.0 100.0 67.8 
1980 12002 32585 9145 53732 22.3 60.6 17.0 100.0 67.6 
1985 1 1  744 33 345 9973 55062 21.3 60.6 18.1 100.0 68.9 
Benchmark scenario 
2000 1 1  594 34 986 11 309 57 889 20.0 60.4 19.5 100.0 71.7 
2015 10562 34647 13219 58428 18.1 59.3 22.6 100.0 73.5 
2030 10 181 32402 14935 57518 17.7 56.3 26.0 100.0 71.5 
2050 9337 30 244 14 098 53679 17.4 56.3 26.3 100.0 70.8 
Fertility Scenario 
2000 11922 34986 11309 58217 20.5 60.1 19.4 100.0 71.7 
2015 11666 34974 13219 59859 19.5 58.4 22.1 100.0 73 5 
2030 1 1  808 33812 14935 60555 19.5 55.8 24.7 100.0 71.5 
2050 11720 33886 14098 59704 19.6 56.8 23.6 100.0 70.8 
Mortality scenario 
2000 11611 35 103 1 1  647 58561 19.8 59.9 20.2 100.0 74.2 
2015 10622 35092 15584 61298 17.3 57.2 25.4 100.0 83.0 
2030 10268 33008 18608 61864 16.6 53.3 30.1 100.0 85.3 
2050 9457 30983 18538 58978 16.0 52.5 31.4 100.0 87.3 
Western Scenario 
2000 10695 35043 11549 57287 18.7 61.2 20.2 100.0 73.1 
2015 7447 33949 14169 55565 13.4 61.1 25.5 100.0 77.5 
2030 6095 28668 16324 51087 11.9 56.1 32.0 100.0 76.5 
2050 4 167 21 027 15 693 40 887 10.2 51.4 38.4 100.0 76.7 
National 1 Scenario 
2000 11 249 35 OM 11 678 57 983 19.4 60.5 20.1 100.0 71.9 
2015 10076 34 592 14 840 59508 16.9 58.1 24.9 100.0 75.7 
2030 9429 32017 18099 59545 15.8 53.8 30.4 100.0 76.1 
2050 8440 28991 19276 56707 14.9 51.1 34.0 100.0 77.3 
National 2 Scenario 
2000 11 762 36387 1 1  678 59829 19.7 60.8 19.5 100.0 71.9 
2015 1 1  015 37 673 14 887 63575 17.3 59.3 23.4 100.0 75.8 
2030 10807 36552 18804 66163 16.3 55.2 28.4 100.0 77.3 
2050 10311 35319 21 170 66800 15.4 52.9 31.7 100.0 79.3 
1.2.2. National scenarios 
The stable mortality of the BM makes this scenario not very probable. Life expectancy is now 
increasing rapidly. Even if quasi stabilisation of death rates, mainly for adult men, occurred in 
Western Europe in the 1960s, actual stabilisation or decrease in life expectancy at birth are 
only found in countries suffering heavy economic problems like in Eastern Europe and 
USSR. We prefer to project a brighter future with increasing economic development and life 
ex?ectancy. Mean fertility in 1980-1984 (1.89) was swelled by the years 1980-1982 (1.94). In 
1984 fertility was slightly over 1.80, which could be the best level to project. - Anyway, a 
rapid increase in fertility would substantially affect the size of the labor force from 2030 only. 
- Consequently, the National 1 scenario differs from the BM by fertility (1.80) and by 
increasing life expectancy until 2050 (88.6 years for females and 80.6 years for males) (Mesle 
and Vallin, 1989). Marriages and divorces are the same as in the BM. Two other caractenstics 
of the National 1 scenario are increasing labor force participation rates for females, (about 
stable rates for males) (Marc and Marchand), and progressively postponing age at retirement, 
starting in 2010 to reach 65 years in 2030 for both sexes - the latter hypothesis aims at 
reducing the increase in pension expenditures due to the baby-boom cohorts. - Let's remind 
that the possibility of postponing retirement age will mainly depend on the situation of the 
labor market. - In the National 2 scenario, the immigration of 100.000 persons of all ages and 
both sexes was included yearly. This represent a moderate immigration (slightly over the 
observed one in recent years). A yearly immigration of 50,000 persons would not much 
change the results of the National 1 scenario. 
Ageing in the national 1 scenario is much quicker than in the BM. In 2015 the proportion of 
the elderly is more than 2 percentage points higher than in the BM (24.9 %). In 2050 (with 
34.0 %) the difference with the BM is almost 8 percentage points. 
Immigration slightly reduces ageing by 1.5 percentage point in 2015 and 2.3 percentage 
points in 2050. 
In the National 1 scenario, from 1985 to 2015, the number of the elderly is increased by 49 % 
and by 93 % in 2050. From 2030 the number of the population aged 60 and over in the 
national 2 scenario is higher than in the national 1, by 4 % in 2030 and by 10 % in 2050, due 
to ageing of immigrants. 
The different scenarios show that the best way to limit ageing in the long term is an increase 
in fertility to the replacement level. Increasing life expectancy is responsible for a huge 
increase in the elderly population. 
The sex ratio of the elderly (table 2) will increase until 2015 in the BM and the Western 
scenarios. Stabilisation is only due to the stabilisation of mortality rates in these scenarios. 
Increasing life expectancy until 2050 causes an increase of the sex ratio until the end of the 
projection period. 
1.3. The marital composition of the elderly population 
In the BM, the proportion of single elderly people of each sex (table 3) will sharply increase 
after 2015; the propomon of them married decreases from 1985 to 2015, more rapidly for 
men than for women, and at the same pace for both sexes afterwards. These evolutions are 
due to lower nuptiality in the generations born after 1950. The propomon divorced will 
mainly increase until 2015. No marked change will occur in the propomon of widows or 
widowers. 
Table 3. Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over. 19852050. 
Females Males 
Single Married Divorced Wldowed Total Single Married Divorced Widowed Total 
1985 8.6 42.3 3.6 45.5 100.0 7.9 76.2 2.8 13.1 100.0 
Benchmark Scenarlo 
2000 7.2 41.0 5.6 46.1 100.0 8.9 72.1 4.7 14.3 100.0 
2015 7.6 39.6 9.3 43.5 100.0 10.1 69.0 7.3 13.6 100.0 
2030 11.8 35.7 10.3 42.3 100.0 16.1 63.4 7.4 13.1 100.0 
2050 14.3 32.6 10.1 43.0 100.0 19.1 60.6 7.3 13.0 100.0 
Fertility Scenario 
2000 7.2 41.0 5.6 46.1 100.0 8.9 72.1 4.7 14.3 100.0 
2015 7.6 39.6 9.3 43.5 100.0 10.1 69.0 7.3 13.6 100.0 
2030 11.8 35.7 10.3 42.3 100.0 16.1 63.4 7.4 13.1 100.0 
2050 14.3 32.6 10.1 43.0 100.0 19.1 60.7 7.2 13.0 100.0 
Mortalrty Scenario 
2000 7.2 43.1 5.6 44.1 100.0 8.9 72.3 4.6 14.1 100.0 
2015 7.6 46.4 9.0 37.1 100.0 9.9 69.0 7.0 14.1 100.0 
2030 11.3 44.1 10.2 34.4 100.0 15.1 62.9 7.3 14.7 100.0 
2050 13.8 40.2 10.2 35.7 100.0 18.6 58.0 7.2 16.2 100.0 
Western Scenario 
2000 7.2 42.0 5.7 45.1 100.0 9.0 71.7 4.9 14.4 100.0 
2015 7.7 41.0 10.9 40.5 100.0 10.1 65.9 10.0 13.9 100.0 
2030 12.5 35.4 14.8 37.3 100.0 17.2 56.8 12.7 13.3 100.0 
2050 23.7 27.4 14.7 34.2 100.0 31.4 44.9 11.6 12.1 100.0 
National 1 Scenario 
2000 7.2 4 1.7 5.6 45.4 100.0 8.9 72.6 4.7 13.8 100.0 
2015 7.6 42.4 9.0 41.0 100.0 10.0 70.1 7.1 12.8 100.0 
2030 11.2 40.4 10.2 38.2 100.0 15.4 64.9 7.4 12.4 100.0 
2050 13.7 37.8 10.2 38.3 100.0 18.6 60.8 7.2 13.3 100.0 
National 2 Scenario 
XX)O 7.2 41.7 5.6 45.4 100.0 8.9 72.6 4.7 13.8 100.0 
2015 7.5 42.5 9.0 40.9 100.0 10.0 70.1 7.2 12.8 100.0 
2030 11.2 41.1 10.2 37.6 100.0 15.4 65.1 7.4 12.0 lM.O 
M50 13.3 38.9 10.2 37.5 100.0 18.7 61.2 7.3 12.9 100.0 
The propomon single is multiplied by 2 between 2000 and 2050. The proportion divorced 
will be almost 3 times as high in 2030 as in 1985. But the proportion of the elderly population 
in these marital statuses is still low in 2050: 7 % for divorced males (10 % for females) and 
19 % and 14 % for singles males and females respectively. The result is a decrease in the 
propomon married by 10 percentage points, from 42 % to 32 % for women, by 15 points, 
from 76 % to 61 % for men. 
The mortality scenario only changes the proportion of married and widowed persons. Married 
women and widowed men are more frequent in this scenario, due to the narrowing of the sex- 
gap in mortality. 
The Western scenario sharply increases the proportion of single persons between 2030 and 
2050, and consequently decreases the proprotion married. The proportion divorced goes on 
increasing after 2015. The propomon of widowed women decreases after 2015; no marked 
change occurs for widowed men. 
The two national scenarios are very close to each other in tenns of marital status of the 
elderly and they are close to the BM for males, as projected marriage and dvorce rates are the 
same in these scenarios. For females, the decreasing mortality of the national scenarios causes 
lower proportions of widowed (5 percentage points) and equally higher proportions of 
married women than in the BM scenario. 
1.4. The working-age population 
The working-age population of both sex (table 4) increases until 2000 and decreases sharply 
after 2015 in the BM (by 7 % between 2015 and 2030 and another 7 % between 2030 and 
2050). The fertility scenario reduces very much the decrease which is between 3 % and 4 % 
from 2015 to 2030. Then a stabilisation appears. The mortality scenario is very close to the 
BM but it reduces slightly the decrease. The Western scenario causes a huge decrease of the 
working age population (12 % from 2015 to 2030 and 24 % from 2030 to 2050). 
Table 4. Population aged 1559 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Absolute (1 000s) 
Benchmark total 33 426 34 986 34 647 32 402 30 244 
Fertility total 34 986 34 974 33 812 33 886 
Western total 35043 33 949 28 668 21 027 
Mortality total 35 103 35 092 33 008 30 983 
National 1 total 35 056 34 592 32017 28991 
National 2 total 36 387 37 673 36 552 35 319 
Index 
Benchmark total 100 105 104 97 90 
Fertility total 105 105 101 101 
Western total 105 101 66 63 
Mortalrty total 105 105 99 93 
National 1 total 105 104 96 87 
National 2 total 109 113 110 106 
After 2000, the working age population in the National 1 scenario is slightly lower than in the 
BM, mainly due to fertility (1.80 against 1.89). It decreases mainly after 2015, being in 2050 
13 % under the number in 1985. In the national 2 scenario, immigration increases the number 
of the 15-59 age-group until 2015, but afterwards low fertility causes a decrease, though, the 
number in 2050 is still higher than in 1985, and is only 7 % lower than in 2015. 
The marital composition of the working age population shows little change in the BM. The 
main evolutions take place before 2015; they are a decrease in the proportion married and 
'consequent increases in the proportion divorced from 1985 to 2000 and in the proportion 
single from 2000 to 2015. A slight increase in the proportion of manied women occurs after 
2015. In the fertility scenario it is noticeable that the increase in the proportion of married 
females of the BM gives place to a similar increase in the proportion single after 2015. For 
single males the same increase as for females occurs and is compensated for by a slight 
decrease in the proportion of manied persons. These are due to changes in the age-structure 
of the 15-59, following fertility increase. Mortality scenario is quite close to the BM for 
males. The proportion of widowed women is reduced by 1.3 percentage point, which is 
relativly very important (from 3.5 % in 1985 to 2.2 % in 2015); the proportion manied 
increases in consequence. 
The Western scenario increases the proportion single and decreases the proportion manied 
until 2050, the former being about equal to the latter in 2015 for females and then larger (it is 
larger for males from 2015). The proportion divorced gets higher than in the BM, by around 3 
percentage points (6.8 % to 9.9 % for females, 5.0 % to 7.8 % for males) in 2015 and 
decreases slightly afterwards. For females a slight decrease of the proportion widowed 
appears after 2000. The two national scenarios are close to the BM. 
The position of the different scenarios regarding the old age dependency ratio (OADR) (fig. 
2, table 5) is the same as for the proportion of the 60+; but a little more favorable in the 
Western scenario, as the decrease in the population aged 0-14 is not taken into account in this 
index. In 1985 there were 19.7 persons in the age group 65 and over per 100 persons aged 15- 
64. The ratio will be between 23% and 24% in 2000 in any scenario. The most probable 
scenarios lead to between 28% and 29% in 2015. The period 2015-2030 will be that of 
maximum ageing, the OADR in 2030 being higher than in 2015 by 10 or more percentage 
points in the mortality, Western and National 1 scenarios. Only immigration or an increase in 
fertility would markedly reduce ageing. Ageing would increase at a lower pace after 2030, 
reaching 48 persons aged 65 and over for 100 persons of working age in 2050 (National 1 
scenario). 
--- Fertility 
* * - = -  Mortality 
Western 
--- National 1 
- .  - National 2 
Figure 2. Old age dependency ratio 
Table 5. Dependency ratios, 19852050 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Under 15 
Benchmark 32.2 30.8 27.6 28.3 27.9 
Fertility 31.7 30.2 31.6 31.5 
Mortalrty 30.7 27.3 27.9 27.4 
Western 28.4 19.8 18 8 17.1 
National 1 29.8 26.3 26.3 25.9 
National 2 30.1 26.6 26.6 26.2 
65 and Over 
Benchmark 19.7 23.1 25.0 31.6 32.3 
Fertility 23.1 24.8 30.4 29.1 
Mortality 24.3 30.2 40.2 43.5 
Western 23.6 27.7 39.1 30.4 
National 1 24.0 28.9 40.0 48.4 
National 2 23.1 26.7 36.1 43.6 
Total 
Benchmark 51.9 53.9 52.6 59.9 60.1 
Fertility 54.8 55.0 62.0 60.6 
Mortality 55.1 57.5 68.0 70.9 
Western 52.0 47.5 57.9 67.5 
National 1 53.8 55.1 66.4 74.3 
National 2 53.3 53.3 62.6 69.8 
2. PENSIONS 
2.1. The pension system 
There are over 100 pensions regimes, dealt by over 400 foundations (table 6). The 
diversification will still increase with the new systems of insurance appearing now (see below 
fourth level). The total pension expenditures represented 11.3% of GNP in 1988 or 647 
billion FF. 
Table 6. Total Numbers of old age penslons pald by the main Soclal Securiiy Regimes 
1985 
(au 1.7) 
ROgime gOnOral 
ROgime des salarlOs agricoles 
Fonctionnaires civils et militaires 
Collectivites locales 
Ouvriers d'Etat 
lrnprirnerie Nationale 
S.N.C.F. 
Mines 
Etabiissernent National des 
lnvalides de lo Marine 
E.D.F.-G.D.F. 
Chemins de Fer Secondoires 
R.A.T.P. 
Autres regimes de solori~s 
Comrner~ants (ORGANIC) 
Artisans (CANCAVA) 
Professions liberales 
Exploitants agricoles 
Mutuelle d'assurance vieillesse 
des cultes 
1 TO~OI  13035400 1m.m I I I 
Source :CNAVTS, La Retraite des salaries, %curlt i rociale, Rapports annuels. 
The pension scheme is a three levels system. 
- basic insurance (compulsory); this is the so-called "Regime General" for wage-earners 
- complementary insurance (compulsory) AGIRC, ARCO, etc... 
- supplementary insurance (optional), and rather for higher staff. 
A fourth level appears with voluntary insurance, consisting of different types of pension plans 
proposed by Savings-Banks, Insurance Companies and other enterprises. 
The frrst three levels are pay-as-you-go systems. The fourth level is a saving-type system. 
Civil servants have a unique Regime regrouping basic and complementary levels. For non- 
wage earners, the basic regime is identical to the "Regime General". 
Inactive people may contribute to a basic regime. Aid (minimum vieillesse) is given to any 
person receiving no pension, if helshe is without minimum private means ("condition de 
ressources"). 
The basic level is regulated by laws or decrees. The complementary level is regulated by 
lobby groups ("partenaires sociaux"). 
Disability pensions, early retirement and arduous work pensions, given according to age or 
activity duration, exist. Disability pensions are commuted to old age pensions at the age of 60. 
Survivors pensions called "droits dCrivCs" may be cumulated with old-age pensions - with an 
upper ceiling ("avec condition de ressources") at the Regime General. 
Pensions served by the basic level are calculated by annuities 50 % of the 10 (25 in a near 
future) best years of salary will be given as a pension for a full right; 75% of the 6 best 
months for a civil servant. The complementary level is a system of points. The value of the 
point is evaluated yearly. 
A full pension is given at the age of 60 (55 or 50 for some categories of workers, SNCF, 
teachers ...) for 150 terms (37.5 years) of activity (table 7). Interruptions of activity creates 
right to pensions (child rearing,illness ...) 
Table 7. Characteristics of Regime General 
Number of pensions paid (1000s) 5860 
Total benefits pald (millions of francs) 147 014 
Average annual old-age benefits (francs) 25 107 t2) 
Number of persons insured (1000s) 12 944 
Ratio pensions/insured (per 1000) 2 210 
Contribution rate 13.9 
Full pension 50 % for 37.5 years 
Income basis for calculating benefits last 10 years (I) 
Upper ceiling for contribution and benefits Yes 
(1) last 25 years from 1990. 
(2) The Regime General represent lest than 50 % of the pensions paid In France. This value Is 53 579 at the Income 
Survey (INSEE) Including basic aid (Minlmum vleillesse). 
Pensions are reevaluated on the basis of the price index (better than the wage index). Bonus 
are given for children or spouse in charge. Contributions rate was 13.9 % in 1985 (14.8 % in 
1987) at the "Regime General", 4.8 % at the complementary level, and 2 % for the effect of 
lowering retirement age at 60. 
Solidarity is the basic principle of the system. 
- Solidarity between generations 
- national solidarity: income taxes provide 10 % of the pensions fund (Regime General), other 
taxes 5 %; 85 % comes from the contributions 
- solidarity between regimes: a complex calculation of compensation balances the treasury of 
the different regimes. 
2.2. Retirement and work pattern 
Retirement age was 65 years until 1981, when it was reduce to 60. Main data are available 
only fiom the Regime General, so mean age at retirement which they enable us to calculate 
does not exactly represent the real situation (fig. 3 and 4). It seems that practice never suited 
the legislation: in 1979, mean age at retirement was 64 years for both sexes. It decreased after 
1981 and was 62.4 years in 1984 and 1985. It is 61.6 years for both sexes over the whole 
projection period in the IIASA scenarios. At the Regime General, mean activity duration was 
31.8 years for men and 29.3 for females for old-age pensions, against 37.5 years requested. 
Note here that 40 years ago the pensions system didn't work properly and some people 
worked without paying contributions. 
O/O 
50 
60 61 6 2 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Yo -Figure 3. New retirees by age, 1985 Age 
30 
60 6 1 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Figure 4. New retirees by age, 1985 (cumulative) Age 
Female activity is rapidly increasing since 1975 (fig. 5). According to the 1985 employment 
survey, 74 % of all women (69 % of spouses) (fig. 6) aged 25-29 were active and over 70 % 
(66 % of spouses) until the 40-44 age group. Activity rate of women without spouse is 90 % 
at the adult ages. 
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75and+ 
Figure 5. Labor force participation rates by age and sex, 1975 and 1982 censuses 
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Figure 6. Labor force participation rates of women by marital status, 1985 
Employment Survey, INSEE 
Male activity will decrease very slightly in a near future, but it could increase again if 
retirement age at 65 is reset. 97 % of men aged 35-39 were active in 1985. 
The projected trends of labor force participation rates for females and males results in the 
evolution of average number of years worked presented in tables 8 and 9 and in the 
percentage of pensioners shown in table 10. 
Table 8. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement. 19852050 (constant labor force participation 
rates -benchmark scenario) 
1985 2000 2315 2030 2050 
Males 41.9 41.4 39.7 38.8 38.7 
Females 21.8 22.9 26.2 26.8 26.8 
Table 9. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement. Women by marital status. 1985-2U30 (constant 
labor force participation rates -benchmark scenario) 
Single Married Divorced Widowed 
1985 33.5 19.5 29.5 23.6 
2000 34.5 22.0 30.7 26.0 
2015 33.7 23.7 32.1 27.7 
2030 33.3 23.3 31.7 27.3 
Table 10. Percentage claiming for old-age pension, 19852050 (maximum cohort activity rate) 
Date at which mean age at retirement is reached 
1985 2300 2315 2030 2050 
Males 99.3 98.6 97 .O 97.0 97.0 
Females 
single 79.8 80.7 87.2 87.2 87.2 
marrled 43.1 46.3 60.0 73.3 73.3 
divorced 77.6 80.7 85.5 85.5 85.5 
widowed 73.2 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9 
2.3. Pensions expenditures 
The "retirees's boom" causes an explosion of the pensions expenditures (table 11 and fig. 7). 
In the BM and in the Fertility scenarios, pensions expenditures increase until 2030 and then 
decrease as does the population aged 60 and over. The increase is most rapid from 2000 to 
2015 (average annual growth rate being respectively 0.9 % in 1985-2000, 1.2 % in 2000- 
2015 and 1.0 % in 2015-2030). Expenditures are 37 % higher in 2015 than in 1985 for males. 
The increase in female pensions expenditures is more rapid than for males (46 % from 1985 
to 2015), as female activity is increasing. Total pensions expenditures, including survivors 
pensions, will have increased by 38 % in 2015, 60 % in 2030. In the BM, survivors pensions 
expenditures are 12.7 % of the total in 1985, 11.4 % in 2015 and 11.1 % in 2050 (1 1.2 % in 
National 1 and 8.2 % in mortality scenario). 
Table 1 1. Pension expenditures. 1985-2050 
Scenario 1985 MOO 2015 2030 2050 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Absolute (millions of francs) Index (1985 = 100) 
Benchmark old age 276952 320559 389102 453128 428231 116 140 164 155 
survivors 40 427 44 815 50411 55310 53 269 1 1 1  125 137 132 
total 317378 365374 439513 508439 481500 115 138 160 152 
Mortality old age 337 291 466 467 579 025 581 320 122 168 209 210 
survivors 44 059 47 016 50 912 52 049 109 116 126 129 
total 381 350 513 484 629 934 633 369 120 162 198 200 
Western old age 328627 421446 504129 490805 119 152 182 177 
survivors 44 305 48 590 51 061 44 665 110 120 126 110 
total 372932 470036 555 191 535470 118 148 175 169 
National 1 old age 332742 402 720 490005 549 952 120 145 177 199 
survivors 45 386 50 292 55411 58 869 112 124 137 1 46 
total 378128 453012 545416 608821 119 143 172 192 
National 2 old age 332 750 403 823 502 372 599 881 120 146 181 217 
survivors 45 390 50 376 56 286 62 628 112 125 139 155 
total 378 140 454 199 558658 662 509 119 143 176 209 
Percentage Average Annual Growth Rate (96) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 1985/00 20001 15 2015/30 2030/50 
Benchmark old age 87.3 87.7 88.5 89.1 88.9 1 .O 1.3 1.0 -0.3 
survivors 12.7 12.3 11.5 10.9 11.1 0.7 0.8 0.6 -0.2 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.9 1.2 1 .O -0.3 
Mortality old age 88.4 90.8 91.9 91.8 1.3 2.2 1.4 0.0 
survivors 11.6 9.2 8.1 8.2 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.2 2.0 1.4 0.0 
Western old age 88.1 89.7 90.8 91.7 1.1 1.7 1.2 -0.1 
survivors 11.9 10.3 9.2 8.3 0.6 0.6 0.3 -0.7 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.1 1.5 1.1 -0.2 
National 1 old age 88.0 88.9 89.8 90.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.6 
survivors 12.0 11.1 10.2 9.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.5 
National 2 old age 88.0 88.9 89.9 90.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 0.9 
survivors 12.0 11.1 10.1 9.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 
Billion FF 
Figure 7. Changes in total old age benefits (billion French Francs) 
The mortality scenario shows a much steeper increase than the BM. Pensions expenditures for 
both sexes are around 17% higher than in the BM in 2015 and 24% in 2030. Note here that 
male life expenctancy is too high (for France) and that increasing life expectancy should be 
projected after 201 5. 
The Western scenario is between the BM and the Mortality scenarios, but rather closer to the 
former. 
The progressive postponement of age at retirement (starting in 2010) to 65 years in the 
national scenarios reduces -in comparison with the Mortality scenario- the effect of increasing 
life expectancy on pensions expenditures, mainly in 2015 and 2030 (national 1 scenario) The 
difference is about 20 percentage points in 2015 (index 143 against 162) and 26 points in 
2030. The average annual growth rate of the pensions expenditures from 1985 to 2015 is 
1.2 5% in the National 1 scenario while the mortality scenario implied a rapid growth rate 
(2.0%) from 2000 to 2015. From 2015 to 2030 the growth rate of the pensions expenditures is 
1.2% in the National 1 scenario against 1.4% in the mortality scenario. The increase in the 
pensions expenditures after 2030 in the National scenarios are due to the increase in life 
expentancy until 2050. The postponement of age at retirement no longer has an effect on the 
increase of the numbers of retirees nor on the pensions expenditures after 2030. Due to the 
size reached by the total pension expenditures in 2030, the growth rate decelerates afterwards, 
but 60 billion FF are still added from 2030 to 2050 to the pensions expenditures in the 
National 1 scenario and 100 billion in the National 2 scenario. In 2050 pensions expenditures 
are nearly twice as high as in 1985 in the National 1 scenario, about as high as in the mortality 
scenario. In the National 2 scenario evolution is the same as in the National 1 until 2015, then 
retired immigrants increase quicker the pensions expenditures. 
2.4. Contributions 
Contributions show a much slower evolution than the pensions expenditures (table 12, 12bis 
and 13). A slight increase (6 %) from 1985 to 2000 and then stabilization until 2015 will 
occur. In 2030 the level is the same as in 1985 and 2050 is 6 % lower (7 % for males, 5 % for 
females). 
The fertility and mortality scenarios are not very different from the BM until 2015, the 
increase being 1 or 3 percentage point higher. These two scenarios show a decrease in the 
contributions between 2015 and 2030 but the level in 2030 is still 4 % higher than in 1985. 
The situation stabilises in the fertility scenario, but a further decrease appears in the mortality 
scenario and contributions in 2050 are 2 % under their level in 1985. We can now say that the 
fertility scenario is the only one which stabilises the contributions. 
The Western scenario is close to the fertility and the mortality scenarios until 2015, then when 
smaller generations enter the labor force, contributions decrease steadily, being in 2030, 6 % 
below their 1985 level, (30 % in 2050). 
The National 1 scenario increases contributions in 2015 twice as much as does the mortality 
scenario; contributions in 2015 are 19 % higher than in 1985. This is due to the postponement 
of retirement age to 65 years and to higher labor force participation rates for women. Low 
fertility causes a decrease in the contributions after 2015, the index in 2030 (1 13) is 6 points 
below the index in 2015; the index in 2050 is 103. Therefore contributions are still a little bit 
higher than in 1985. 
Immigration in the National 2 scenario increases the contributions faster than does the 
national 1 scenario. They are 18 % over the 1985 level as early as 2000 and 29 % higher in 
2015. Contributions are stable fiom 2015 to 2030 for both sexes (a slight progress for males 
and a slight decrease for females). Then they decrease slower than in the National 1 scenario. 
The 1st variant of the BM (BM65)l is close to the national 1 scenario until 2015 for both 
sexes. Then contributions decrease just as in the BM. To delay retirement age appears not to 
be a long-term solution. 
The second variant (BM GDR)2 is different mainly for women. Ln 2000 and 2015 
contributions of women are 47 % above their level in 1985, but they then decrease even faster 
than in the BM. 
Contributions of both sexes are around 10 percentage points higher in this variant than in the 
first one. This variant is equal to the National 2 scenario in 2015 and then about 10 percentage 
points below. 
1Retirement age is 65 years from 1985. 
2Female labor force participation rates are those of GDR, the highest observed in Europe. 
Table 12. Size of the labor force, 1965-2050 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2350 
Absolute (1 000s) 
Benchmark males 14 771 15 708 15 600 14 765 13 796 
females 9 748 10495 10 526 9 935 9 252 
total 24 518 26 2U3 26 130 24 700 23 049 
Fertility males 15 708 15 694 15 313 15 318 
females 10 495 10 580 10 322 10 279 
total 26 203 26 274 25 635 25 597 
Western males 15 761 15 542 13 453 10 018 
females 10 589 10 841 9 582 7 281 
total 26 350 26 383 23 035 17 299 
Mortalrty males 15 816 16 022 15 341 14 468 
females 10 517 10 620 10 070 9 424 
total 26 333 26 642 2541 1 23 892 
National 1 males 16 160 16 853 16 144 14 818 
females 1 1  818 12 349 1 1  641 10 540 
total 27 978 29 202 27 785 25 358 
National 2 males 16 832 18 356 18 477 18 034 
females 12 250 13 297 13 142 12 661 
total 29 083 31 653 31 619 30 695 
Index 
Benchmark males 1M 106 100 93 
females 108 108 102 95 
total 107 107 101 94 
Fertility males 106 106 104 104 
females 108 109 106 105 
total 107 107 105 104 
Western males 107 105 9 1 68 
females 109 1 1 1  98 75 
total 107 108 94 7 1 
Mortality males 107 108 104 98 
females 108 109 103 97 
total 107 109 104 97 
National 1 males 109 114 109 100 
females 121 127 119 108 
total 114 119 113 103 
National 2 males 114 124 1 25 122 
females 126 136 135 130 
total 119 129 129 1 25 
19 
Table 12 bis. Contributions 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Absolute (millions F.F.) 
Benchmark females 88 479 95 264 95 542 90 183 83 983 
males 162 186 172475 171 339 162 123 151 487 
total 250 665 267 739 266 88 1 252 306 235 470 
Fertility females 95 264 96 034 93 695 93 302 
males 172 475 172 325 168 136 168 197 
total 267 739 268 359 261 831 261 499 
Western females % 116 98 401 86 979 66 088 
males 173 056 170 658 147 714 110004 
total 269 172 269 059 234 693 176 092 
Mortalrty females 95 464 96 394 91 407 85 539 
males 173 661 175 929 168 447 158 862 
total 269 125 272 323 259 854 244 401 
National 1 females 107 272 112 089 105 666 95 672 
males 177 437 185 047 177 269 162 708 
total 284 709 297 137 282 935 258 379 
National 2 females 1 1 1  194 120 696 1 19 290 1 14 925 
males 184 824 201 547 202 884 198017 
total 296 018 322 244 322 173 312 942 
Index 
Benchmark females 108 108 102 95 
males 106 106 100 93 
total 107 106 101 94 
Fertility females 108 109 106 105 
males 106 106 1M 104 
total 107 107 1M 1M 
Western females 109 1 1 1  98 75 
males 107 105 91 68 
total 107 107 94 70 
Mortality females 108 109 103 97 
males 107 108 1M 98 
total 107 109 1M 98 
National 1 females 121 127 119 108 
males 109 114 109 100 
total 114 119 113 103 
National 2 females 126 136 135 130 
males 114 124 125 122 
total 118 129 1 29 125 
Table 13. Overall activlty rate , 19852050 
Scenario 1985 XXX) 2015 2030 2050 
Males 
Benchmark 70.7 70.4 67.8 65.3 65.2 
Fertility 70.4 67.7 65.7 66.6 
Mortality 69.6 64.5 60.4 59.1 
Western 70 .O 66.7 62.2 57.3 
National 1 71.8 70.7 67.0 63.9 
National 2 72.4 71.9 68.7 65.6 
Females 
Benchmark 43.2 43.7 42.4 40.2 39.9 
Fertility 43.7 42.3 40.6 41.1 
Mortality 43.4 41.1 38.4 37.6 
Western 44.0 43.7 41.0 37.8 
National 1 48.8 48.2 44.7 42.0 
National 2 49.4 49.2 46.2 43.7 
2.5. The Ratio Contributions/Benefits 
As a result of the huge increase in the pensions expenditures and of the slow increase in the 
contributions, the ratio of the latter to the former, i.e. the balance of the pensions fund is 
deteriorating more or less rapidly according to the different scenarios. 
The rather slow increase in the expenditures and the slow increase of the contributions from 
1985 to 2000 fairly limit the deterioration of the balance in the near future (table 14, fig.8). 
Nevertheless from a hypothetical balanced situation in 1985, a deficit of 7 % appears in the 
year 2000 in the BM. In 2015, the deficit is 23 % and 37 % in 2030 and 2050. In comparison 
with the BM, the fertility scenario causes a lesser deterioration after 2015, with a 35 % deficit 
in 2030 and only 31 % in 2050. 
Table 14. Ratio contribution/benefits 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 0.79 0.73 0.6 1 0.50 0.49 
Fertility 0.73 0.6 1 0.52 0.54 
Mortality 0.71 0.53 0.4 1 0.39 
Western 0.72 0.57 0.42 0.33 
National 1 0.75 0.66 0.52 0.42 
National 2 0.78 0.7 1 0.58 0.47 
Ratio contributions 1 benefits 
--- Fertility 
* * * * *  Mortality 
Western 
National 1 
....- National 2 
Figure 8. Ratio contribution/benefits 
The mortality and the Western scenarios cause quicker deterioration of the balance: 11 % or 
9 % deficit in 2000, 33 % and 28 % as soon as 2015. Contributions would cover only a little 
bit more than half of the expenditures in 2030 and 2050 (except for the Western scenario with 
only 42 % in 2050). 
The National 1 scenario causes slower deterioration of the pensions fund until 2015 than the 
four basic scenarios do and keeps an advantage on the mortality scenario until the end of the 
projection period. Nevertheless deficit is rapidly increasing from 2000 to 2030. The National 
2 scenario stabilizes the balance until 2000, then the deterioration is slower than in the 
Natioanl 1 scenario until 2015. Afterwards the pace of deterioration is about the same in both 
national scenarios, but deficit in 2050 is only 40% in the National 2 scenario against 47% in 
the National 1. 
3. POPULATION POLICIES OF AGING 
3.1. Cutting benefits versus increasing contributions 
The probable increase in life expectancy in the coming decades appears very difficult to 
compensate for the pensions system. Huge cuts in the pensions benefits or important increases 
of the contribution rate will be necessary to balance the frnancial situation of the pensions 
system. 
A slight increase in the contribution rate by a little over 1 percentage point in the BM or 
Fertility scenarios, 2 points in the Mortality would be enough to balance the pensions fund 
until 2000 (table 15). The National 1 scenario limits increase in the contribution rate to 0.8 
percentage point, while the National 2 scenario stabilizes the rate. - Increasing female labor 
force participation rates (BM GDR) and a sudden change in age at retirement (BM 65) would 
render a lower contribution rate possible.- Cuts in benefits would be limited to 7% (BM or 
fertility), 11% (mortality), or 5% or only 1% in the national 1 and 2 scenarios. 
2 2 
Table 15. Cuts in benefits and contrlbution rate correspondng to a balanced pension fund, 1985-2030 
Scenarlo 1985 X X X )  2015 M30 2050 
Cuts in Benefits a) (percentage) 
Benchmark - 7 - 23 - 37 - 38 
Fertility - 7 - 23 - 35 - 31 
Mortality - 1 1  - 33 - 48 - 51 
Western - 9 - 28 -46 - 58 
National 1 - 5 - 16 - 34 - 47 
National 2 - 1 - 10 - 27 -41 
BM (65) + 22 + 6 - 17 - 19 
BM (GDR) + 5 - 12 - 27 - 28 
Balanced Contrlbutlon Rate b, 
Benchmark 17.8 21.3 26.0 26.6 
Fertlllty 17.8 21.3 25.0 24.1 
Mortaldy 18.4 24.6 31.7 33.3 
Western 18.1 22.8 31.0 39.6 
National 1 17.3 19.7 25.0 31 .O 
National 2 16.7 18.3 22.4 27.7 
BM (65) 13.6 15.5 19.8 20.4 
BM (GDR) 15.7 18.6 22.5 22.9 
a) As c o w r e d  with 1985. 
b) Actwl rate 13 X .  
In 2015, the contribution rate should be increased by 5 percentage points (BM or fertility) or 8 
points (mortality) and 3.2 points in the National 1 scenario; while the national 2 scenario 
enables an increase nearly half that (1.8 point). In 2030, another 5 percentage points should be 
added to the contribution rate in the BM - 4 points in the fertility scenario. In the mortality 
scenario the contribution rate should reach 31.7% (twice the rate in 1985); a 25% or 22 % rate 
would be enough in the national scenarios but 31 % should be reached in 2050 in the national 
1 scenario (28 % in the national 2). 
In 2015, cuts in benefits would range from 23% (BM and fertility) to 33% (mortality). The 
national 1 scenario limits the cuts to 16% and the national 2 scenario to 10%. In 2030 cuts 
reach 37 % (BM) or almost half the benefits (mortality). As regarding the cuts in benefits, the 
National 1 scenario (with 34% cuts in 2030 and 47% in 2050) reaches the level of the 
mortality scenario 15 years earlier. The national 2 scenario will have a greater advantage, 
with 27% cuts in 2030 and 41% in 2050. 
Cuts in the benefits and increases in the contribution rate become too high as early as 2015 in 
the four basic scenarios, or from 2030 in the national scenarios, to enable only one of these 
parameters to support the cost of ageing. An equilibrium should be found between the efforts 
solicited from the retirees and from the working population. 
3.2. Impact of policy measures 
The "GDR" scenario leads to an important increase in the number of females retirees - due to 
higher LFPR - in 2000 (52% compared with the BM) but in the long term the difference is 
much smaller : 15% in 2030 and 2050. Differences are very small (below 4%) for males 
(table 16). 
Table 16. lncreaslng participation In the labor force and age at retirement. Impact on the number of retirees. 19852050 - 
benchmark scenario 
Scenario 1985 2000 ZQ15 2030 2050 
Number of Retirees (1000s) 
Benchmark males 3842 4440 5134 5747 540 1 
females 3006 3596 4910 6423 6126 
total 6848 8036 10044 12170 11527 
Absolute Changes (1000s) 
'GDR' males + 64 + 117 + 229 + 179 
females + 1886 + 1398 + 968 + 894 
total + 1950 + 1515 + 1197 + 1073 
'65' males - 1028 - 1334 - 1291 - 1237 
female - 589 - 1055 - 1167 - 1037 
total - 1617 - 2389 - 2458 - 2274 
Relative Changes (%) 
'GDR' males + 1.4 + 2.3 + 4.0 + 3.3 
females + 52.4 + 28.5 + 15.1 + 14.6 
total + 24.3 + 15.1 + 9.8 + 9.3 
'65' males - 23.2 - 26.0 - 22.5 - 22.9 
female - 16.4 - 21.5 - 18.2 - 169 
total - 20.1 - 23.8 - 20.2 - 19.7 
The "65" scenario drops the number of retirees of both sexes by around 20% (23% for males 
and 17% for females) from 2000 to 2050. The higher activity level of the "GDR" scenario and 
the older age at retirement of the "65" scenario increases the average number of years worked 
(table 17). The increase is 5 years for males under both scenarios and, for females, 9 years 
under the "GDR" and 2 years under the "65". 
Table 17. Increasing pamcipation in the labor force and age at retirement, Impact on the average number of years 
worked. 19852050 - benchmark scenario 
Scenario 1985 2000 M15 2030 M50 
Benchmark males 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 
females 28.4 28.6 28.8 28.9 28.9 
'GDR' males 45.9 45.9 45.9 45.9 
females 37.6 37.6 37.6 37.6 
'65' males 45.7 45.7 45.7 45.7 
females 30.6 30.8 30.9 30.9 
Table 18 shows that the influence of the "GDR" scenario on total benefits is almost nil for 
males but reaches 11.7% for females in 2000 or 7.5% in the long term. The "65" scenario 
reduces total benefits by almost a quarter for males and from 22% in 2000 to 15% in 2050 for 
females. 
Table 18. lncreasing partlclputlon In the labor force and age at retlrement. Impact on total benefits. 1985-2050 - benchmark 
scenario 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Total Benefits (millions of F.F.) 
Benchmark males 163715 190436 223797 250499 2354 19 
females 1 53664 174938 215716 257939 2408 1 
total 3 17379 365374 4395 1 3 508438 48 1500 
Absolute Changes 
'GDR' males - 214 - 330 - 819 + 975 
females + 20533 + 20309 + 19295 + 18514 
total + 20319 + 20579 + 18476 + 19489 
.65' males - 43894 - 59989 - 58936 - 56226 
females - 4231 1 - 49539 - 45396 - 38165 
total - 86205 - 109519 - 104332 - 9439 1 
Relative Changes (%) 
'GDR' males - 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.3 + 0.4 
females + 11.7 + 9.7 + 7.5 + 7.5 
total + 5.6 + 4.7 + 3.6 + 4 0  
'65' males - 23.1 - 27.0 - 23.6 - 23.8 
females - 21.6 - 20.9 - 16.4 - 14.4 
total - 22.4 - 23.8 - 19.8 - 18.8 
The impact of the "GDR" scenario on the ratio contributions/benefits (table 19) is a 10 
percentage points bonus in 2000 and 2015 and 8 points from 2030. The "65" scenario brings 
about a strong improvement in the ratio contributions/benefits. In 2000, the situation of the 
pension fund (almost balanced with 0.96) would be better than in 1985 and also in 2015 
(0.84). Then an important drop appears with around 35% deficit in 2030 and 2050. This 
corresponds to a 18% cut in benefits. 
Table 19. lncreasing participation In the labor force and age at retirement. lmpact on the ratio contribuhon/benefits. 
1985-2050 
Scenario 1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 0.79 0.73 0.6 1 0.50 0.49 
'GDR 0.83 0.70 0.58 0.57 
'65' 0.96 0.84 0.66 0.64 
Retirement age of 65 in the 1st variant of the BM brings substantial benefits (or reduction of 
the contribution rate) in 2000 (22%) and still in 2015 (6%) (table 15). After 2015 the effect of 
this measure is not sufficient, though in 2030 the 1st variant reduces the cuts by half (in 
comparison with the BM or fertility). 
The advantage of increased female labor force participation (BM GDR) is much below that of 
the 1st variant. 
CONCLUSION 
For France, the most interesting among the four basic scenarios is the Mortality scenario as it 
takes into account increasing life expectancy, but male mortality of this scenario is too low 
for France. Due to the very low fertility hypothesis of the Western scenario, this scenario is 
not very probable for France where fertility seems to stabilize around 1.80. The fertility 
scenario shows a very important issue : an increase in fertility has no effect on the pensions 
system until 2030, when larger generations will enter the labor force. 
The National 1 scenario shows that retirement age of 65 years is not necessary now (and may 
not be possible at the moment, due to unemployment) when additio~al costs of ageing can 
be still supported by contributors. But it would become necessary after 2010-2015 in order to 
reduce the rapid growth of pensions expenditures in 2000-2030, which an increase in fertility 
would not have substantially reduce. The National 2 scenario shows that immigration reduces 
the deficit of the pensions system, due to increasing labor force, until 2015; but from 2030 it 
increases the pensions expenditures and no longer has a positive effect on the balance of the 
system which, from 2015, will deteriorate at the same pace in both national scenarios ; 
immigrant cohorts should be always increasing. 
2050 is a very far perspective. Decreases in mortality rates will still be possible and the 
balance of the pensions system could still deteriorate, as seen in the national scenarios 
(compared with the BM or Mortality scenarios), but at a slower pace than in 2000-2015. 
Increasing immigration and the benefits of an increased fertility some 30 or 40 years ealier 
could offer solutions at that time. On another hand, better economic situation would help very 
much to balance the pensions system. 
Longer active periods for males and females as well as immigration will cause important 
increases in the pensions expenditures in the future and are not the long term solutions of the 
pensions problem. Higher expectations of life at older ages will be very difficult to 
compensate for in populations where fertility is below replacement level. 
Actually the pension problem is two-sided. Until 2030, pension funds will face retirement of 
the baby-boom cohorts ; postponement of retirement age and immigration - in the frame of a 
favorable labor market - would help to balance the pension funds. After 2030 negative 
population growth and decreasing labor force affect the pension system. Increased fertility or 
increasing immigration would maintain the size of the labor force. 
As the demographic solutions for the next 30 or 40 years : postponing retirement age and 
immigration are dependant on the situation of the labor market, economic solutions such as 
indexing pensions on net (instead of gross) income and constituting reserves, should be 
implemented (Verniere, 1990). 
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